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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 1979 
No. 79-886 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, ET AL., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL .. 
Respondents. 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION 
AS AMICUS CURIAE 
The Federal Bar Association, 
with the consent of the parties, submits 
this Brief as amicus curiae in support of 
Petitioners. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether conmunications between 
employees of a corporation and an attor -
ney representing that corporation are 
entitled to the full protections of the 
attorney-client privilege only when the 
employees are those responsible -for de-
ciding and directing the corporation's 
response to the attorney's legal advice. 
INTEREST OF THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION 
The Federal Bar Association is a 
professional association of approximately 
14,000 lawyers and judges, the majority o 
whom are now or have been in service to the 
Federal Government. The Association is 
dedicated to advancing the science of 
jurisprudence and promoting the administra-
tion of justice and the highest quality 
representation before the Courts, depart-
ments, and agencies of the United States. 
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The parties to this case neces-
sarily must focus upon the facts and the 
law in the context of their own interests 
and the particular circumstances of this 
case. But the question of the extent to 
which the attorney-client privilege pro-
tects connnunications between attorneys 
and their corporate clients implicates 
interests transcending the specific and 
narrow interests of Petitioners and 
Respondents in this litigation. The 
bedrock of the privilege is the nature 
of legal representation itself, and the 
constriction upon the privilege adopted 
below may influence the practice of law 
in a way contrary to the public's inte-
' 
rest in the sound administration of jus-
tice and transaction of business by 
public institutions. The restrictive test 
for determining the extent of the attor-
- 3 -
ney-client privilege, embraced by the 
Court below, may impede effective and 
responsible legal representation of 
Federal agencies as well as corporations. 
This Brief will focus upon 
these broad adverse consequences of the 
restrictive test for application of the 
attorney-client privilege that was 
1/ 
adopted below.-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The narrow scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege adopted by the Court 
below is a disservice to the public's in-
terest in ensuring that public and private 
organizations receive responsible legal 
counsel for the conduct of their business. 
l./ We will not address the question presented 
to this Court with respect to whether the work 
product doctrine was properly applied in this 
case. 
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Limiting the protections of the attor-
ney-client privilege to communications 
with a small number of people at the very 
top of an organization ignores the reali-
ties of how business is conducted by 
institutions today. It fails to recog-
nize t t day-to-day business decisions 
are made by lower level management and 
that the institution's business is con-
ducted by operating personnel. These 
subordinate employees need to receive 
confidential legal counsel by attorneys 
fully knowledgeable in all facts perti-
nent to the subject matter of the legal 
advice. Denying the attorney-client 
privilege to attorneys' coIIDllunications 
with such employees will impede this flow 
of information and legal advice critical 
to the lawful conduct of modern business. 
Facts of pertinence to opera-
tion of public and private institutions 
- 5 -
are possessed firsthand generally by sub-
ordinate personnel, not by those few mem-
bers at the very top of the organization 
in its control group. The control group 
test presents a most unfair choice to 
attorneys and their organization clients 
-- either to investigate the facts fully 
from such subordinate personnel and 
thereby incur the risk that such facts 
will be susceptible to discovery from 
counsel, or to decline to investigate 
comprehensively and thereby render legal 
advice upon less than the complete factual 
picture. Moreover, even if the choice is 
made to interview subordinate personnel, 
these employees, knowing that their com-
munfcations are not confident~al, may 
naturally be reluctant to speak candidly. 
The net effect will be to make it more 
difficult to assure that an organization's 
- 6 -
business is conducted in conformity with 
the law. 
The narrow test adopted by the 
Court below conflicts with common-law 
principles sustaining application of the 
attorney-client privilege to communica-
tions with an attorney by an agent of 
the client. E.g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2317, at 618 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
The decision below clashes with the de-
cisions of many State courts of this 
Nation that have followed this common-law 
rule. It clashes with the decisions of 
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that have 
accorded greater protection to conmrunica-
tions between subordinates of an organiza-
tion and the organization's counsel. 
Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. v. Decker, 
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 
U.S. 348 (1971); Diversified Industries, 
- 7 -
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (en bane). The broader test of 
Diversified Industries should be adopted 
by this Court as the rule best accormno-
dating all competing interests and thus 
most desirable "in the light of reason 
and experience." Rule 501, Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE NARROW, "CONTROL GROUP" TEST FOR 
APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN 
ATTORNEYS AND THEIR CORPORATE CLIENTS 
WILL IMPEDE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 
OF SUCH CLIENTS, CONTRARY TO THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST. 
A. Effective And Responsible Legal 
Representation Of Any Client Be-
gins With The Attorney Investi-
gating An · Discovering All Perti-
nent Facts That May Be~r Upon The 
Matter Upon Which The Client Has 
Requested Legal Ad~ice. ------~-
~election, analys :·.s, and under-
standing of the facts he or she profes-
sionally regards as pertinent is the law-
- 8 -
yer's invariable first step in serving the 
interests of his or her client. See, e.g., 
D. Binder & S. Price, Legal Interviewing 
and Counseling: A Client-Centered Ap-
proach 3 (1977); B. Shawcross, The Fune-
tions and Responsibilities of an Advocate 
16 (1958); Justice Jackson, The Advocate: 
Guardian of Our Traditional Liberties, 36 
A.B.A.J. 607, 610 (1950); see also L. 
Patterson & E. Cheatham, The Profession 
of Law 66 (1971). Such analysis of facts 
is an integral part of the legal evalua-
tion process; and indeed it lies at the 
very heart of the attorney-client re-
lationship: 
"A client must feel free to 
discuss whatever he wishes 
with his lawyer and a lawyer 
must be equally free to ob-
tain information beyond that 
volunteered by his client. 
A lawyer should be fflly 
informed of all the acts of · · 
the matter he is handling in 
order for his client to obtain 
the full advantage of our legal 
- 9 -
s~stem. It is for the lawyer in 
t e exercise of his independent 
profes·sional jud·S$ent to setarate 
the relevant and 1mp·o·rtant ·rom 
the irr·e!evant and unimpo·rtant. 
The observance of the ethical 
obligation of a lawyer to hold 
inviolate the confidences and 
secrets of his client not only 
facilitates the full develop-
ment of facts essential to 
proper representation of the 
client but also encourages lay-
men to seek early legal assis-
tance." 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 
Ethical Consideration 4-1 (emphasis added) ; 
see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 
511 (1947); ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 3-5. 
It is natural and inevitable for a lawyer, 
and an element in the exercise of his or 
her professional skill, to gather, assimi-
late, and analyze facts objectively before 
assuming the role of either counselor or 
advocate. In dispute resolution cases, 
for example, prospective litigants gene-
rally will not themselves know what, if . 
- 10 -
any, claims or defenses they may have and 
will come to a lawyer, present all facts, 
and let the lawyer decide which facts may 
be pertinent to legally sound claims or 
defenses. Only until initially con-
front.ing all the facts impartially can 
advocates competently tender partisan 
counsel regarding which claims or de-
fenses are possible, which are likely to 
succeed, and which are likely to fail. 
This process can only be achieved through 
objective analysis of all the total fac-
tual circumstances made known to counsel 
and further disclosed by counsel's in-
vestigative efforts to learn the facts. 
As this Court has long held, 
the very purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege is to facilitate this first 
stage of effective legal representation, 
learning the facts. E.g., Chirac v. 
Reinicker, 24 U.S. 474, 477, 11 Wheat. 
,, 
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280, 294 (1826); Blackburn v . ·crawford' s 
Lessee, 70 U.S. 186, 193, 3 Wall . 175, 
192-193 (1865); Connecticut Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 
(1876); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 
470 (1888); Alexander v. United States, 
138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891); United States 
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 
318, 336 (1915); Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). The privilege 
is society's recognition that, without 
the protection the privilege accords, a 
client may be reluctant to share with 
even his or her attorney all the facts 
possessing possible relevance to the 
client's legal problem. The restrictive 
test for protecting counnunications of the 
corporate .client unnecessarily derogates 
this societal incentive to effective 
legal representation. 
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B. The Narrow, "Control Group" Test 
For Applying The Attorney-Client 
Privilege To Corporations Will 
Inhibit The Full Investigation 
And Discovery Of All Facts Bear-
ing Upon The Matter Upon Which 
The Corporate Client Needs Lega1 
Advice. 
"The concept of the privilege 
to encourage consultation with an attor-
ney to assure lawful conduct is as im-
portant to the corporat1 n as it is to a 
natural person. Both need legal advice 
and representation and it is in the 
public interest that they have it." M. 
Ladd & R. Carlson, Cases and Materials on 
Evidence 335 (1972). What approach to 
the attorney-client privilege best imple-
ments this policy of encouraging lawful 
conduct? Clearly, a rule is necessary 
that accords more protection than the 
narrow, restrictive control group test 
adopted by the Court below. 
A relatively unimpeded flow of 
- 13 -
information and legal advice is critical 
to the lawful conduct of modern business. 
The complexity and wide-ranging scope of 
laws intended to regulate business 
affairs necessitate the rendering of un-
inhibited legal counsel to assure that 
the day-to-day operation of the business 
is in full compliance with the law. See 
Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.Supp. 
136, 144 (D. Del. 1977), quoting United · 
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 
F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950); Note, 
The Attorney-Client Privilege and the 
Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 303, 306, 309 (1977). 
Increasing involvement of corporate 
counsel in the day-to-day business affairs 
of the corporation will further the public 
interest by making it easier to plan 
corporate affairs to avoid litigation. 
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 
- 14 -
508, 513 (D.Conn. 1976). In situations 
potentially or actually involving liti-
gation, an unimpeded flow of information 
enables the corporate attorney to inter-
view employees in order to determine 
exactly what happened and to guage the 
various facets of the case. Weinschel, 
Corporate Employee Interviews and the 
Attorney Client Privilege, 12 B.C. Ind. 
& Com. L. Rev. 873 (1971). 
Limiting the attorney-client 
privilege to conm1unications with those 
at the very top of the corporate pyramid 
frustrates these objectives. The control 
group test ignores the fact that middle 
management executives, while not having 
the final word in major corporate issues, 
nevertheless play a major role in the 
decisionmaking process. Their advice may 
be sought by upper echelon executives, or 
they may in fact make decisions which are 
- 15 -
only summarily approved by their su-
periors, or which need not be reviewed 
by their superiors at all. Weinschel, 
supra at 876. Manifestly these mid-level 
managers need to be able to communicate 
freely with corporate counsel as part of 
this decisionmaking process. In addition, 
because middle level executives and other 
subordinate corporate employees may often 
engage in acts for which corporate lia-
bility is sought, there is an obvious 
necessity for these individuals to com-
municate with corporate counsel. Indeed, 
if a corporate employee has the power to 
render the corporation liable for damages, 
should he not also have the power to make 
a confidential communication to, and re-
ceive confidential legal advice from, the 
company's counsel? See Note, Applica-
bility of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
to Corporate Communications, 48 U. Cin . 
- 16 -
L. Rev. 819, 822-823 (1979); McLaughlin, 
The Treatment of Attorney Client and Re ~ 
lated Privileges in the Proposed Rules of 
Evidence for the United States District 
Courts, 26 The Record 30, 33 (1971). See 
also Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-609 (8th Cir. 
1977) (en bane); Rule 801(d)(2)(D), 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
In corporations, those possess-
ing firsthand knowledge of the facts upon 
which responsible legal advice must be 
based are not likely to be those 
representatives of the corporation found 
in the control group, but rather those 
mid-level managers and operating personnel 
in the company whose jobs are to conduct 
the day-to-day business of the company. 
See, e.g., Diversified Industries, 
supra at 608-609; In re Ampicillin Anti-
- 17 -
trust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385-387 
(D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering 
Milliken, Inc., 397 F.Supp. 1146, 1164-
1165 (D.S.C. 1974). In antitrust and 
patent cases, for example, generally much 
of the critical sales and technical in-
formation necessary for responsible 
litigation or corporate counseling would 
be known only by the marketing and en-
gineering "line" people -- not the mem-
bers of the company's board of directors. 
The evils of the narrow, con-
trol group test are that it presents un-
fair choices to attorneys and their 
corporate clients, and may prevent effec-
tive and responsible representation of 
corporations and frustrate attempts by 
corporations and their counsel to ensure 
that corporate action is taken in con-
formity with the law. When faced with 
the need to discover facts upon which to 
- 18 -
render legal advice to the corporate 
client, counsel operating under the 
restrictions of the control group test 
must elect either to interview corporate 
representatives who are not in the con-
trol group, and thereby learn the facts 
but incur the risk that the attorney may 
be compelled to disclose these facts 
publicly because the interviews are not 
privileged; or to decline to interview 
these employees and render advice upon 
less than all the facts. Indeed, even in 
those occasions in which counsel and his 
corporate client choose to incur the risk 
of disclosure and proceed to interview em-
ployees who are not in the control group, 
such employees may be less than candid 
with counsel since they will not be speak-
ing with any expectation that what they 
say will remain confidential. 
Furthermore, the narrow, control 
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group test may mean that corporate employ-
ees not in the control group -- those mid-
level managers and operating people clos-
est to the daily business of the corpora-
tion -- may be deprived of legal advice 
with respect to the conduct of their 
day-to-day operations. Corporate counsel 
may be reluctant to provide such advice 
knowing that it is not confidential legal 
advice. If, for example, corporate coun-
sel were to observe business practices as 
to which there conceivably might be a 
question of liability under the antitrust 
laws, counsel may be reluctant to point 
out ways in which the practices might be 
altered to resolve any doubt that they are 
prohibited under the antitrust laws, for 
fear that by doing so in a nonprivileged 
connnunication counsel will be flagging the 
problem and increasing the risk that legal 
action will be taken against his or her client. 
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Under the view of the privilege 
adopted by the Court below, even when 
legal advice is rendered directly to the 
control group, the restrictive notion of 
privilege may deny the benefits of that 
advice to those who are not in the con-
trol group. To be effective, connnunica-
tions from corporate counsel often re-
quire distribution within the company so 
that the advice may be effectuated. With 
the control group test, however, communi-
cations to others "down the chain of 
command" which relay or are based upon 
legal advice may constitute a publication 
waiving the attorney-client privilege. 
See, e .:A:., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 
693 (10th Cir. 1968). Under the circum-
stances, members of the control group, and 
their attorneys, may naturally be reluc-
tant to communicate fully with lower level 
employees with respect to the subject 
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matter of the legal advice. The result 
will be diminished effectivPriess in de-
termining the corporation's response to 
legal advice. 
In this regard, reducing the 
scope of the protection accorded corpo-
rations by the privilege will deter use 
by corporations of counsel to seek out and 
correct corporate wrongdoing. Any loss 
of this self-policing by corporations, 
with the alternatives being either ab-
sence of detection or detection by govern-
mental agencies at a cost to the public 
fisc, is certainly not in the public 
interest. See Diversified Industries, 
supra at 610; Note, The Attorney-Client 
Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report 
Privilege and Diversified Industries, Inc. 
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v. Meredith, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 699, 713 
2/ 
(1979).-
The narrow, control group test 
conflicts with generally accepted, common-
law principles concerning the proper ap-
pl i cation of the attorney-client privilege. 
In general, the privilege has been recog-
nized to safeguard the confidentiality of 
communications made by agents of a client, 
for the client's benefit, to the client's 
2/ The use of lawyers to conduct analyses and 
reviews similar to that conducted by the 
attorneys for Petitioners in this case is common 
both to the Government and to private industry 
alike. See,~, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (retention by corpo-
ration of outside law ' firm to conduct fnvesti-
gation and render advice regarding possible 
illegal payments to foreign officials by employ-
ees of the corporation); In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); 
"Westinghouse Seeks End to Cloud Caused By Sui ts 
Over Uranium Supply Contracts", Wall Street 
Journal, June 7, 1978, at 17, col. 1 (same); 
"Civil Service Hires Lawyer To Study Alleged 
Abuses", N.Y. Times. Nev. 5, 1977, at 8, col. 6 
(retention of att0rney "to conduct a 'compre-
hensive and independent inquiry"' into alleged 
abuses withi:a the Civil Service Commission); 
(continued on next page) 
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counsel. E.g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
3/ 
§ 2317, at 618 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); 
(continued from page 22) 
Diversified Industries, supra (retention by 
corporation of outside counsel to conduct an in-
vestigation and report to the board of directors 
concerning allegations of the commission of 
bribery by employeee of the corporation); Herlihy 
& Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment 
Problem, 8 Law & Pol. Int'!. Bus. 547, 586-587 
(1976) (retention by corporations of outside coun- . 
sel to conduct independent investigations of 
possible management fraud); SEC Current Report, 
Form 8-K, Cities Service Co., Comm'n File No. 
1-1093, at 1, 3, 5-6 (Sept. 1975) (retention by 
corporation of outside counsel to investigate 
possible illegal payments to foreign political 
entities and other illegal accumulations or use 
of corporate funds); CBS, Inc., "Report of 
Counsel, Investigation of Prize Money Descrip-
tions With Respect to the 'Heavyweight Champ-
ionship of Tennis' Matches" (July 1, 1977) (re-
tention by corporation of outside counsel to 
conduct an investigation and report to manage-
ment concerning allegations that tennis matches 
that were advertised and promoted as involving 
prize money to be awarded on a "winner-take-all" 
basis in fact involved prize money to be awarded 
proportionately to the losers as well as to the 
winners) (Report on file at Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Washington, D.C.). 
1/ "The client's freedom of communication requires 
a liberty of employing other means than his own 
personal action. The privilege of confidence 
would be a vain one unless its exercise could be 
thus delegated. A communication, then, by ?ny 
form of agency employed or set in motion by the 
client is within the privilege. 
(continued on next page) 
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Annot., Evidence: Attorney-Client Privi -
lege as Applicable to Cormnunications Be-
tween Attorney and Client 's Agent, Em-
ployee, Spouse, or Relative, 139 A.L.R. 
1250, 1251 (1942). So, too, employees of 
the corporation not in the control group 
should be entitled to speak confidentially 
to counsel for their principal, the corpo-
rate client. English authority has held 
corranunications between all company employ-
ees and company counsel to be protected 
by the attorney-client privilege when the 
corranunications relate to the subject 
matter as to which the company is seeking 
legal advice. E.g., Wilson v. Northhamp-
ton & Banbury Junction Ry., 14 Eq~ity 
(continued from page 24) 
"This of course includes connnunications through 
an interpreter, and also communications through 
a messenger or any other agent of transmission, 
a~ well as co~imuni cations originating with the 
client's agent and made to the attorney." 
(Emphasis in original; f ootnotes omitted.) 
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Cases 477, 484 (1872). In this country, 
the great majority of the State courts 
that have considered the question have 
adhered to this "English Rule" and have 
not confined the attorney-client privi-
lege to the select few members of an or-
ganization's control group. See, e.g., 
Jay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 340 So.2d 
456, 457 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); D.I. 
Chadbourne Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 
2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 
(L964); Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, 27 
N.E. 483 (1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 
A.2d 125 (1963); Fire Ass'n of Philadel-
phia v. Flennning, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S.E. 420 
(1887); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 
2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Riddle Spring Realty 
Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 220 A.2d 751 
(1966); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400i 
129 A.2d 417 (1957); Ford Motor Go. v. 
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O.W. Burke Co., 59 Misc.2d 543, 299 N.Y.S. 
2d 946 (Sup.Ct. 1969); In re Hyde, 149 
Ohio 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948); Gass v. 
Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Ct.Civ. App. 
1960); Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. 
A. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 
272 (1913); contra Shere v. Marshall 
Field & Co., 26 Ill.App.3d 728, 327 N.E. 
4/ 
2d 92 (1974).- This rule recognizing the 
!!._/ Six states, by statute, have modified this 
common-law rule in their jurisdictions by adopt-
ing Rule 502(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974), which defined "representative of 
the client" in "control group" terms, i.e., as 
"one having authority to obtain professional 
legal services, or to act on advice rendered pur-
suant thereto, on behalf of the client." 3A Ark. 
Stat. Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 502(a)(2); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule 502; 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.075; N.D. Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 502; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2502; S.D. 
Rules of Evidence§ 19-13-2. This definition of 
"representative of the client" appeared in the 
Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), but was eliminated 
by the Advisory CoDDDittee from the 1972 Final 
Draft of the Proposed Rules that was approved by 
this Court in 1972. No definition of "rep-
resentative of the client" was contained in the 
Rules approved by this Court. See Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
503; see also 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Wein~ 
stein,;-Evidence 1 503[03] (1979). 
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need for corporate clients to speak con -
fidentially, through agents, to cor porate 
counsel was incorporated in model codes 
of evidence promulgated in 1942 and 1953. 
American Law Institute, Model Code of 
Evidence. Rule 209 (1942); National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform Sthte 
Laws, Uniform Rules of Ev idence, Rule 26( 3) 
(1953). And, of course, the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits have applied broader , 
subject matter tests for the application 
of the privilege to corporations, rather 
than the narrow, control group test 
adopted by the Sixth Circuit below. 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v . Decker, 
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) . 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 
U.S. 348 (1971); Diversified Indus t ries , 
5/ 
supra. 
5/ For several decisions of District Courts apply-
ing the "subject matter" test, see Pet i t i oners ' 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, note 1 . 
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The Court below afforded scant 
discussion of its rationale for rejecting 
the broader, subject matter test conso-
nant with these common-law principles. 
It assumed that, if the subject matter 
test were adopted, corporate members of 
the control group -- those at the very top 
of the corporation -- inevitably would 
seize upon that test in order "to shield 
themselves from information about possibly 
illegal transactions." United States v . 
• 
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 
1979). The Court hypothesized that the 
control group would purposely insulate it-
self from the "full details" of the trans-
action which is the subject of the legal 
advice; and that corporate counsel thus 
would be "the exclusive repository of un-
pleasant facts," which would remain "un-
discoverable." Id. 
The Court's reasoning is an in-
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adequate justification for so restricting 
the attorney-client privilege as applied 
to organizations. Even if the control 
group chose to act in the manner sug-
gested by the Court below -- an unduly 
harsh assumption concerning the bona 
fides of high level corporate and agency 
officials -- the Court's concern that all 
facts would reside, undiscoverable, only 
with counsel, does not follow. The 
attorney~client privilege, properly ap -
plied, would not prevent inquiry directly 
of the corporate employees whom corporate 
counsel had interviewed; nor would it pre-
vent discovery directly from the corpora-
tion of pertinent documentary evidence 
(other than written communications with 
counsel). E.g., 4 Moore's Federal Prac -
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tice 1 26.60[2], at 26-233 to -234 (2d 
6/ 
ed. 1979).- Nor would it allow such 
documentary evidence to be shielded from 
disclosure by funnelling the evidence to 
corporate counsel. E.g., Grant v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); Radiant 
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 
F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 929 (1963). The privilege would 
only prevent the unseemly scenario of 
corporate counsel becoming unwilling wit-
nesses and sources of evidence against 
their clients. See Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 516-518 (1947) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
6/ The Court below concluded that, in this case, 
the burden of this discovery from sources other 
than corporate counsel would be "severe." While 
this may be true in the particular circumstances 
of this case, this condition is hardly an adequate 
justification for enunciating a rule of general 
application which discounts the ability of a dis-
covering party to obtain information from sources 
other than corporate counsel without doing vio-
lence to the attorney-client privilege. 
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We submit that the approach of 
the Eighth Circuit in Diversified I ndus-
tries provides sufficient protection for 
the interests served by the attorney-
client privilege while simultaneously 
recognizing the need for appropriate 
discovery in litigation. The Diversified 
Court held that communications between 
all co~porate employees and corporate 
counsel may be privileged if "(1) the 
communication was made for the purpose 0 f 
securing legal a dvice; (2) the employee 
making the communication did so a t the 
direction of his corporate superior ; (3) 
the superior made the request so that the 
corporation could secure legal advice; (4) 
the subject matter of the communication is 
within the scope of the employee ' s corpo-
rate duties; and (5) the communication is 
not disseminated beyond those persons who, 
because of the corporate structure, need 
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to know its contents." Diversified Indus-
tries, supra at 609. See also 2 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
1 503(b) [04] (1979}. The Diversified 
test provides a protection that is more 
in tune with the legal needs of corpora-
tions and of the role of the corporate 
attorney today. We urge that it be 
adopted by this Court. 
II. THE NARROW, "CONTROL GROUP" TEST FOR 
APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT 
WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE REPRE-
SENTATION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES. 
The structure and operation of 
Federal agencies make them as subject as 
corporations to the pernicious conse-
quences of the restrictive "control group" 
test for defining the limits of the 
attorney-client privilege. This is an 
additional reason why this test should 
not be approved by this Court. 
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Agencies, like corporations, 
are not characterized by one, small group 
of upper-level managers conducting the 
agencies' day-to-day business. Decision-
making authority is decentralized and dif-
fused, so that the day-to-day decisions 
are made by middle and lower level 
management. See, e.g., Wallace, A New 
Test for Management by Objectives, 2 The 
Bureaucrat 362, 366 (1974); W. Gellhorn & 
C. Byse, Administrative Law 103 & n.9, 
109 (5th ed. 1970); H. Hensel & J. Millett, 
Departmental Management in Federal Adminis-
tration 33-35, 42 (1949); see also P. 
Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsi-
bilities, Practices 136 (1974). There 
simply is no readily identifiable "control 
group" of upper management wi th the exper-
tise and time to direct all individual 
facets of the day-to-day affairs of the 
agency. Nor would it be a desirable system 
for managing the agencies if there were. 
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See Drucker, supra at 555 ("[a] structure 
that forces decisions to go to the highest 
possible level of organization rather than 
be settled at the lowest possible level is 
clearly an impediment"). 
This realistic view of how 
agencie~ are managed dictates that there 
be assurance that agency counsel may 
freely and effectively advise middle 
management and other subordinate employ-
ees without the inhibitions that will 
attend if the control group test is at 
play. Agency lawyers, like their corpo-
rate counterparts, should not have to 
confront the Robson's choice of foregoing 
complete oral or written corrnnunications 
with middle level managers or operating 
personnel, for fear that the substance of 
these communications will not be privi-
leged, and thereby basing their legal ad-
vice upon incomplete data, or engaging in 
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such corrnnunications and thereby incurring 
the risk of subsequent disclosure. 
Middle level managers and other subordi-
nate agency personnel must n ~ f eel in-
hibited by fear that corrnnunications are 
not privileged; they must be free to be 
candid with their counsel, to share all 
facts with their attorneys, so that 
agency counsel may render responsible 
legal advice, based upon all pertinent 
data, to these employees, as well as to 
those at the top of the agency management. 
And we should expect no less if our 
agency decisions are to have rational 
bases. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
The control group test will 
also adversely impact upon agencies in 
litigative contexts . All the facts which 
need to be known by attorneys represent-
ing agencies are not known, fir sthand, by 
the small control group of managers at the 
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very head of the agency. They may be 
known by middle level managers and ope-
rating people. This is a fact of life 
common to agencies as well as cor~ora-
tions; and the restriction of the 
attorney-client privilege solely to com-
munications from the control group would 
hamper effective litigation counseling 
and representation in court. Agencies 
and corporations alike would experience 
the same inhibitions chilling frank dis-
closure to attorneys; there would be the 
prospect of attorneys, by conscious de-
cision or by the foFce of this reluctance 
of agency employees to speak frankly, 
furnishing legal representation with less 
than complete knowledge and understanding 
of the controversy. 
Should this Court affirm the 
decision below, the spectre of lower courts 
applying the control group test to Federal 
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agencies is not a fanciful one. Courts 
have recognized the similarities between 
agencies and corporations, and have 
accordingly applied the same rules or 
tests for each when applying the attor-
ney-client privilege. See, e.g., Hearn 
v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash. 
1975); see also Coastal States Gas Corp. 
v. United States Department of Energy, 
No. 79-2181, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Cir. 
Feb. 15, 1980); Mead Data Central, Inc. 
v. United States Department of the Air 
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.25 (D.C. Cir . 
1977). Unless this Court expressly in-
structs .otherwise, the similarities in 
the structure and operation of corpora-
tions and Federal agencies are so great 
that lower courts may find no logical 
distinction precluding application of the 
control group test to agencies. The ad-
verse consequences of the control group 
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test thus would be compounded, for the 
negative impact upon Federal agencies, 
charged with service in the public inte-
rest, would be injurious to the Nation. 
To the extent the control group test 
would influence negatively the rendering 
of effective and responsible counsel to 
Federal agencies, the American public 
· would be the loser. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed insofar as it adopts the ''control 
group" test for the application of the 
attorney-client privilege, and the cause 
remanded with instructions that the 
Court apply the standard adopted in 
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 
572 F.2d 596, 606 (8 t h Cir. 1977) (en bane). 
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